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CONTINUING QUESTIONS IN AVIATION LIABILITY LAW:
SHOULD ARTICLE 17 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION





A IR CARRIER LIABILITY under the Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air ("Warsaw Convention"),' has always been
strictly limited; however, faced with a variety of tort claims aris-
ing from Article 17's carrier liability provision,2 courts have pro-
ceeded to place further limitations on recovery. One of the
areas most directly impacted by these limitations is the compen-
sability of emotional distress under the Warsaw Convention's
limited liability regime. Courts have attempted for years to in-
terpret and solidify the meaning of ambiguous phrasing and ter-
minology, and the debate has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.
Ever since the Warsaw Convention was opened for signature
seventy-three years ago, dissatisfaction has been so widespread
that there have been numerous multilateral attempts to amend,
supplement, and modify the convention's sometimes unreasona-
ble provisions.' One of these areas of dissatisfaction deals with
whether compensation for damages arising from emotional dis-
tress is available under the Warsaw Convention. A number of
* Candidate for J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2003; B.A., Brigham Young University, 2000.
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. Specific monetary limitations
are dealt with in Articles 20 and 22. See id. arts. 20 and 22.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967).
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decisions, most notably Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,4 have indi-
cated that there can be no recovery for purely mental injuries.'
In Floyd, for example, the Supreme Court not only rejected the
view that there can be any recovery for purely mental injuries
under the limited liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention,
but also concluded that unless a passenger was made to "suffer
death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury," an air
carrier could not be held liable.6
However, while Floyd effectively served to rule out recovery for
purely mental injuries, the court expressly declined to state its
views concerning whether passengers could recover for mental
injuries accompanied by physical manifestations of injury.7 This
left the court in Carey v. United Airlines to attempt to answer "the
question of whether such physical manifestations satisfy the
'bodily injury' requirement" of the Warsaw Convention's Article
17.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined
that physical manifestations of emotional distress do not satisfy
the bodily injury requirement, and the Warsaw Convention,
therefore, leaves the plaintiff without remedy.9
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Carey court failed to
make any reasonable distinction between the plaintiffs physical
manifestations of emotional distress and other cases wherein re-
covery was available to plaintiffs unable to demonstrate claims
flowing from a physical injury, but were able, nevertheless, to
satisfy the bodily injury requirement."' Consequently, while the
court's decision purports to resolve this issue, it affords more
confusion than clarity.
,I Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) [hereinafter Floyd fl.
5 See Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir.
1998) (characterizing the plaintiffs injuries as "purely psychic injuries that do
not qualify as bodily injuries under the Warsaw Convention"); Turturro v. Conti-
nental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (absent any "physical
wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in the structure of an internal
organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or inability to con-
centrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not compensable").
6 Floyd I, 499 U.S. at 552.
7 Id.
8 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
, Id. at 1053.
M Id. at 1053-54.
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II. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Even before the first nonstop flight over the Atlantic in
1927,11 many world governments saw the potential associated
with international commercial aviation and clamored to estab-
lish a regulatory regime to encourage the emergence and
growth of the industry.' 2 As a result, international conferences
were held with the objective of creating, by treaty, "a certain de-
gree of unification in the legal rules governing international air
transportation. ' 3 The Warsaw Convention was the result of two
such conferences-one held at Paris in 1925 and another held
at Warsaw in 1929. "
Established at the Paris convention, a permanent committee
of air law experts, the Comite International Technique
d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens ("CITEJA"), realized that
"[c]ommon rules to regulate international air carriage ha[d] be-
come a necessity."' 5 It was not only necessary to formulate a uni-
form system because of the "many countries of different
languages, tariffs, and legal systems" affected, but it was also nec-
essary to "protect airlines against potentially ruinous claims for
compensation and against exorbitant insurance premiums"' if
the fledgling aviation industry were to survive.
Parties to the Warsaw Convention conferences, therefore, laid
out two specific objectives: (1) to establish a uniform scheme of
dealing with claims arising out of international transportation
(including the assessment of liability for damages caused in the
course of transportation, as well as resolving jurisdictional com-
plications arising from such assessment); and (2) to limit poten-
tial air carrier liability in the event that damages resulted from a
related accident.17 It was believed that the convention would
create a more stable operating environment for the newly devel-
oping aviation industry thereby "afford[ing] the carrier a more
1 Charles Lindbergh was the first aviator to pilot a nonstop fight over the At-
lantic on May 20-21, 1927. 7 ENCYCLOPXDIA BRITANNICA 371 (15th ed. 1998).
12 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498.
13 WARSAW CONVENTION introduction at I (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald Schmid
eds.) (9 Supp. 1998) (1992).
14 Id.
15 Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12,
1929, Warsaw 13 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) (address of Mr.
Lutostanski, head of the Polish delegation), rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Floyd II].
"' WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 1.
17 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99.
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definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates,
with the probable result that there would eventually be a reduc-
tion of operating expenses." 18 This would, in turn, prove benefi-
cial for passengers and shippers through reduced transportation
charges and a more definite basis of recovery. 9
The main objectives of the contracting parties were met and
the treaty was concluded at Warsaw in 1929.20 The United States
subsequently acceded to the Warsaw Convention in 1934,2 and
although it denounced the agreement in 1965, that denuncia-
tion was later withdrawn.2 2 The Warsaw Convention, for nearly
three quarters of a century, has governed the law of interna-
tional commercial aviation and operated as the core legal appa-
ratus through which air carriers have been afforded tremendous
liability protection as well as the mechanism through which
plaintiffs have been able to seek and recover damages for inju-
ries sustained during international flights.
III. THE WARSAW CONVENTION SINCE 1929
A. WARSAW CONVENTION
As a comprehensive multilateral treaty designed to encompass
"all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods
performed by aircraft for hire, '"2 the Warsaw Convention has
enjoyed significant longevity, but not without controversy. Dis-
satisfaction with the convention in general, as well as particular
dissatisfaction relating to the liability limitations of Article 22,24
led to repeated attempts to modify, amend, or circumvent by
private agreement, the provisions viewed as unsatisfactory.
By 1935, CITEJA had already produced a draft revision of the
Warsaw Convention and, in the years following World War II
and the dissolution of CITEJA, the International Civil Aviation
18 Id. at 499-500.
1 Id.
211 On October 12, 1929, there were twenty-three signatories to the Warsaw
Convention but by March 15, 2000, 140 countries had ratified, adhered to, or
acceded to the treaty. LAWRENCE B. GOLIHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION AN-
NOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 331 (2000).
21 WARSAW CONVENTION introduction at 3 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald Schmid
eds.) (4 Supp. 1994) (1992).
22 GoLDruRSCH, supra note 20, at 7.
23 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
24 "It is generally agreed that the major stumbling block in all efforts to mod-
ernize the Warsaw system has been the level of the passenger liability limit." Sven
Brise, Some Thoughts on the Economic Significance of Limited Liability in Air Passenger
Transport, ESSAYS IN AIR LAW 21 (Arnold Kean ed., 1982).
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Organization ("ICAO") continued the efforts of revision by host-
ing international conferences at Cairo (1946), Madrid (1951),
Paris (1952), Rio deJaneiro (1953), and other locations around
the world.25 It was not until 1955, however, that a similar confer-
ence at The Hague resulted in any significant change.
B. HAGUE PROTOCOL
The Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 ("Hague Protocol") 26 did not
amount to a complete revision of the Warsaw Convention's orig-
inal provisions, as hoped, but merely added to them7.2  The
Hague Protocol raised the limits of liability (basically doubling
the limitations established in 1929), provided for costs of litiga-
tion, simplified some documents of carriage, redefined certain
terms, and extended the liability provisions of the convention to
include agents of carriers. 2' Even with these improvements,
however, the United States considered the limits placed on car-
rier liability to be inadequate.
C. MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT
Dissatisfaction with the Warsaw liability limits, even as in-
creased by the Hague Protocol, led the United States, not only
to refuse ratification of the Hague Protocol, but also to submit
its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. 29 In re-
sponse, all major U.S. and foreign carriers serving the United
States negotiated a private voluntary agreement under the aus-
pices of the International Air Transport Association ("IATA"). 30
25 WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 21.
26 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH,
supra note 20, at 311 [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
27 WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 21, at 4.
28 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 20, at 6.
29 S. TREA Y Doc. No. 106-45. In order to improve the chances for ratification
of the Hague Protocol, therefore, its proponents in the United States proposed a
form of accident insurance legislation, which would apply fixed levels of compen-
sation based upon the type of injury sustained, to be considered in conjunction
with ratification of the Hague Protocol. The idea behind the proposed legisla-
tion was to supplement the relatively low liability limitations, establishing a more
acceptable level of liability, and hope that this would remove any further objec-
tions to ratification. Ultimately, the legislation failed and the Hague Protocol,
considered unsatisfactory without it, was never ratified.
30 Id.
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The Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol ("Montreal Interim Agree-
ment")31 took advantage of the provision in Article 22 allowing
carriers and passengers to contract for higher liability limits
Most major air carriers chose to impose upon themselves a
higher ceiling of liability hoping to foster an atmosphere of
greater industry stability and cooperation among world govern-
ments. In accordance with long-standing U.S. demands, partici-
pating airlines raised the passenger liability limit to $75,000,
inclusive of legal fees and costs; and allowed the possibility of
even greater recovery if the injured party could demonstrate
"willful misconduct." With these new contractual provisions in
force, the airlines were able to gain the approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which led to the United States' withdrawal
of its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on May 14, 1966,
a day before the denunciation was to become effective:
D. GUATEMALA CITY PROTOCOL
The Montreal Interim Agreement proved more acceptable to
the United States than previous attempts to shore up the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention, but attempts to revise and
amend the Convention continued, particularly with respect to
passenger rights. In 1971, for example, the Protocol to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929 as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28
September 1955 ("Guatemala City Protocol")35 sought to in-
crease liability limits to $100,000.36
3 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, 14 C.F.R. § 203 (2001); 43 C.A.B. 819, Agree-
ment No. 18900, approved by Order No. E-23680, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH, supra
note 20, at 367 [hereinafter Montreal Interim Agreement].
32 In addition to limiting the carrier liability with respect to the transport of
passengers to 125,000 francs, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention states in part:
"Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
33 WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 6.
34 1 U.S. Av. REP. 445 (1966).
35 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for
signature Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 20, at
369 [hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol].
36 S. TREATy Doc. No. 106-45.
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As an offset to this increase, however, participating airlines
also sought to resurrect earlier attempts, as had already been
seen in the Hague Protocol, to redefine Article 25's "willful mis-
conduct" provision. In exchange for increasing liability limits
and imposing a strict liability standard, the limitations them-
selves would be treated as "unbreakable," removing the possibil-
ity of greater recovery in the event of an air carrier's willful
misconduct." Even if a plaintiff could demonstrate willful mis-
conduct, with this provision in effect the plaintiff would have no
recourse beyond the $100,000 ceiling. This protocol was never
ratified by the United States and has never entered into force.
E. MONTREAL PROTOCOL Nos. 1-4
Despite the failure of the Guatemala City Protocol, the Inter-
national Diplomatic Conference on Private Air Law was held at
Montreal in 1975 and resulted in four additional protocols to
the Warsaw Convention. 8 Although the United States never
signed the first and second protocols, by signing the third and
fourth, it adopted some of the functions of the first two. These
protocols, for example, altered the Warsaw Convention's treat-
ment of the transportation of goods and converted from the use
of the convention's gold standard to the International Monetary
Fund's ("IMF") artificial Special Drawing Rights ("SDR") stan-
dard, designed to operate without regard to worldwide fluctua-
tions in the rate of exchange.39
Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the
Protocols done at The Hague on 28 September 1955 and at
Guatemala City on 8 March 1971 ("Montreal Protocol No. 3" )40
37 Keith Jacobson, Note, A Global Perspective on Airline Tort Liability: The Effect of
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines on American Airline Litigation, 13 DePAuL Bus. LJ.
273, 277 (2001).
38 WARSAW CONVENTION introduction at 10 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald Schmid
eds.) (11 Supp. 1999) (1992).
39 Special Drawing Rights are currency units defined as a basket of national
currencies. The relative values of each currency in the basket are intended to
reflect the volume of export trade in each currency. Special Drawing Rights and
the Warsaw Regime, at http://w.iata.org/legal (located under the Department
of Legal and Corporate Secretary) (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
40 Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929 as Amended by the Protocols done at The Hague on 28 September
1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1975,
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incorporated not only conversion from the gold standard to the
SDR standard "for the purpose of calculating all quantitative
limitations on liability under the Warsaw Convention,"4 but also
incorporated the changes to the Warsaw Convention as seen in
the Guatemala City Protocol.42
However dismal the outcome of the first three protocols, Ad-
ditional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Proto-
col done at The Hague on 28 September 1955 ("Montreal Pro-
tocol No. 4")4 was ratified by the Senate in 1998 and entered
into force in 1999.11 Montreal Protocol No. 4 deals primarily
with the elimination of outmoded cargo documentation provi-
sions, but also adopts the Hague Protocol's substitution of Arti-
cle 25 of the Warsaw Convention.45 This is significant because,
although the United States never ratified the Hague Protocol,
ratification of Montreal Protocol No. 4 has the effect of taking
on the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the
Hague Protocol, and is now binding upon the United States.46
ICAO Doc. 9147, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 20, at 393 [hereinafter Mon-
treal Protocol No. 3].
41 S. TREATy Doc. No. 106-45.
42 This latter incorporation led to a situation similar to the one arising out of
the debate over the Hague Protocol. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
After signing Montreal Protocol No. 3, the United States "considered domestic
legislation that would have established a Supplemental Compensation Plan pro-
viding for a $200,000 insurance based supplement to the Montreal Protocol No.
3 carrier liability limit for passengers (increasing total recovery to approximately
$300,000)." S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45. Like the proposed supplemental acci-
dent insurance legislation accompanying the Hague Protocol, this Supplemental
Compensation Plan also failed and resulted in non-ratification.
43 Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September
1955, opened for signatureSept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9148, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH,
supra note 20, at 401 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4].
44 Jacobson, supra note 37, at 278.
45 Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66J. AIR L.
& COM. 21, 36 (2000).
46 WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 12. The new language of Article 25
"delineates the conduct or omission of a carrier that will be sufficient to break
the limited liability under Article 22," "no longer uses the term 'willful miscon-
duct,'" and "also adopts the Hague Protocol limit of liability of $16,600 for pas-
senger injury or death." Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 36. For the text of The
Warsaw Convention as Amended at The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of
Montreal, 1975, see GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 20, at 515.
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It may seem surprising that the United States would agree to
such low liability limits given its history of dissatisfaction with
similarly low limits; however, the limit of $16,600 "will have no
effect in the United States because all U.S. airlines and a major-
ity of foreign airlines [had already] signed and implemented the
1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreements."47
F. IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENTS
Prior to the United States' ratification of Montreal Protocol
No. 4, IATA proposed several new intercarrier agreements, col-
lectively referred to as the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. These
new agreements were similar to the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment in that they were designed to supplement existing treaty
law and modernize the liability regime available to passengers.
Airlines contracted to participate in a two-tiered liability scheme
wherein they voluntarily waived the Warsaw Convention's Article
22 liability limitations and accepted strict liability for damages
up to $130,000.48 For damages in excess of $130,000, however,
airlines may bar recovery if they demonstrate that they took all
necessary steps to avoid the damage.49
Even with more than ninety percent of the international air
transport industry having signed the IATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment on Passenger Liability ("IATA Intercarrier Agreement"),
it still fails to provide a permanent or satisfactory replacement
for the Warsaw System since it neither alters the text of the
treaty nor does it have the binding effect of treaty law. This
means that, due to the voluntary nature of the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement, airlines can withdraw, and smaller international car-
riers may never feel obligated to subject themselves to the re-
quirements of the agreement.5 Only a multilateral treaty that
47 Id.
48 Jacobson, supra note 37, at 278.
49 Id.
50 IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, at http://www.iata.
org/legal/_files/iia.pdf (last visitedJan. 15, 2003), reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH, supra
note 20, at 577 [hereinafter IATA Intercarrier Agreement]. The IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement was designed as an "umbrella accord" encompassing all subse-
quent IATA intercarrier agreements relating to passenger liability. While this
agreement provided the general principles of accord, subsequent agreements
were meant to spell out the precise legal rights and responsibilities of the signa-
tory carriers. See, e.g., Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement, at http://www.iata.org/legal/_files/mia.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
'' Jacobson, supra note 37, at 279.
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incorporates the achievements of the Warsaw Convention and
its progeny and, at the same time, establishes supremacy over
them will provide a successful replacement for the Warsaw
system.
G. MONTREAL CONVENTION
Although a large number of States have adopted the Warsaw
Convention either in its original form or have become parties to
any number of its amended forms or private supplemental
agreements relating to liability, the result is a convoluted and
almost unmanageable complex of instruments. 52 For this rea-
son, and in response to years of criticism about the current lia-
bility regime, or regimes, the ICAO decided to attempt a
complete revision of the Warsaw Convention, incorporating the
best aspects of its large progeny of amendments, protocols, and
agreements. The Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air ("Montreal Conven-
tion") 5' represents this most recent attempt.
The Montreal Convention was designed "to replace the War-
saw Convention and all of its related instruments and to elimi-
nate the need for the patchwork of regulation and private
voluntary agreements. "'5 To this end, Article 55 of the Montreal
Convention states that it "shall prevail over any rules which ap-
ply to international carriage by air" including the Warsaw Con-
vention, the Hague Protocol, the Guatemala City Protocol, and
Montreal Protocol Nos. 1-4.55 Most notably, the Montreal Con-
vention includes the following features:
(1) [I]t removes all arbitrary limits on recovery for passenger
death or injury; (2) it imposes strict liability on carriers for the
first 100,000 SDR [approximately $135,000] of proven damages
in the event of passenger death or injury; (3) it expands the bases
forjurisdiction for claims relating to passenger death or injury to
permit suits in the passenger's homeland if certain conditions
are met; (4) it clarifies the obligations of carriers engaged in
code-sharing operations; and (5) it preserves all key benefits
achieved for the air cargo industry by Montreal Protocol No. 4.56
52 S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45.
-3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740, reprinted in
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 20, at 531 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
54 S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45.
55 Montreal Convention, supra note 53, art. 55.
56 S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45.
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Despite the fact that many of these changes have been long
sought-after and represent significant successes, when the Mon-
treal Convention enters into effect, 57 the original liability provi-
sions of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention will remain
substantially unaffected.
IV. ARTICLE 17 AND THE "BODILY
INJURY' REQUIREMENT
A. OVERVIEW
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states in part: "The car-
rier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of .. bodily
injuiy suffered by a passenger."' 58 The term "bodily injury," as
used in this context, has given rise to much litigation, disputing
not only its meaning but also its scope of application. It has
been noted that:
From its inception the [bodily injury requirement] has proved
contentious in its application as courts adjudicating claims under
Article 17 have conservatively interpreted the phrase "bodily in-
jury" as either pure physical injury or mental suffering accompa-
nied by physical injury where the latter was a causative factor in
bringing about the former. 9
Most courts have applied this standard and have been unwill-
ing to venture beyond the requirement that a passenger be
made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation
of injury" before permitting recovery against an airline for bod-
ily injury under the Warsaw Convention."' Only recently have
courts attempted to answer the question of whether mental inju-
ries accompanied by physical manifestations of injury are within
the purview of Article 17.61
57 Article 53 of the Montreal Convention states: "This Convention shall enter
into force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirtieth instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary be-
tween the States which have deposited such instrument." Montreal Convention,
supra note 53, art. 53. As of the writing of this commentary, twenty-five countries
have ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the Montreal Convention. Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mt99.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
58 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17 (emphasis added).
59 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-Emergent
Trends, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 225, 225 (2000).
60 Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 552.
61 See, e.g., Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051-52.
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Part of the difficulty arises from the tendency of courts to try
to determine the intention of the drafters of the Warsaw Con-
vention and the meaning of the French term lesion corporelle
(translated into English as "bodily injury") incorporated into the
original treaty document.6 2 The Carey court, for example, relied
heavily on the conclusions drawn in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic
Airways, Ltd.,63 wherein the court agreed with the Floyd analysis
that lesion corporelle was correctly translated as "bodily injury" and
held that because the plaintiff could not demonstrate direct,
concrete, bodily injury, it did not satisfy the conditions for liabil-
ity under the Warsaw Convention.64
Despite the contention arising from the language of Article
17, the majority of proposed changes and amendments to the
Warsaw Convention have dealt with the liability limitations of
Articles 20 and 22.65 The limited debates addressing the lan-
guage of Article 17 have not centered on the bodily injury re-
quirement, but on the distinction between the application of
the term "accident" as opposed to such alternate terms as "oc-
currence" or "event. ' 66 Nevertheless, early drafts of the Mon-
treal Convention's Article 17 would have expressly included
liability for mental injury. 6 7 Later drafts even introduced the el-
ement of personal injury designed to encompass both physical
and mental injuries.6 ' For example, the provision (then Article
16) of the first draft of the Montreal Convention corresponding
to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention read:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury or mental injury of a passenger upon condition only
that the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not
62 See, e.g., Gregory C. Fisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Con-
vention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 12 (1990).
63 Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
64 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052. It should be noted that many of these conclusions
were drawn, in turn, from Floyd I.
65 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20 and 22.
66 Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the
Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 891, 914-19 (2001).
67 Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 27.
68 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 227.
1356
CONTINUING QUESTIONS
liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of
health of the passenger. 6I
Other drafts of the convention even included the term "per-
sonal injury"; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO re-
moved both "mental injury" and "personal injury" from the
provision, choosing, instead, to leave the language virtually un-
changed. As it stands, Article 17, paragraph 1, of the Montreal
Convention provides: "The carrier is liable for damage sustained
in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition
only that the accident which caused the death or injury took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. 70
B. THE COURTS' SEARCH FOR CLARrry
1. Purely Mental Injuries
The current understanding of the application and scope of
Article 17's bodily injury requirement has been established by
two main cases before the Supreme Court and has been both
strengthened and weakened through the cases that have fol-
lowed. In Air France v. Saks,7' the court set the standard for
properly interpreting the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
as an international treaty. In Floyd, the court determined that
"bodily injury" was the correct interpretation of the French term
lesion corporelle and held, therefore, that purely mental injuries
do not satisfy Article 17.72 Since that time, however, and despite
subsequent holdings by two Courts of Appeals that emotional
and mental distress is not compensable under the Warsaw Con-
vention, whether or not accompanied by physical manifesta-
tions, courts continue to find that "there could be recovery for
egregious incidents of intentional misconduct where there is no
concrete or visible 'bodily injury."' 73
In Floyd, multiple damages claims for purely mental injuries
arose from an incident that took place aboard an Eastern Air-
lines ("Eastern") flight from Miami, Florida to Nassau, Bahamas.
During the flight, one of the aircraft's three engines lost oil
pressure and the flight crew responded by shutting down the
69 Id. at 226-27 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consoli-
dation of the Warsaw System, Aviation Q., July 1997, at 286, 313) (emphasis added).
70 Montreal Convention, supra note 53, art. 17.
71 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
72 Floyd , 499 U.S. at 534.
73 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053 n.47.
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failing engine and turning back toward the Miami International
Airport."4 Shortly thereafter, the remaining engines failed and
the flight crew informed the passengers of their intention to
"ditch" the plane in the Atlantic Ocean.7 5 After this announce-
ment, and having lost power and altitude, however, the flight
crew's continued efforts resulted in restarting one of the en-
gines and safely returning to the airport.76
The issue before the court was whether the types of injuries
allegedly sustained by the passengers, and characterized by the
court as being purely mental, were encompassed in the Warsaw
Convention's bodily injury requirement. The District Court, by
relying on another federal court's analysis with respect to the
text and negotiating history of Warsaw Convention,7 7 reached
the conclusion that such injuries were not compensable under
Article 17 . 7  This decision was subsequently reversed by the
Court of Appeals, which, "[a]fter careful consideration of the
French legal meaning of the treaty terms, the concurrent and
subsequent legislative history and conduct of the parties, the
case law and the policies underlying the Warsaw Convention,"
found that Article 17 encompassed purely mental injuries v.7
This decision resulted in conflict between the Eleventh Circuit
and the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., which held that purely mental injuries were
not compensable under the Warsaw Convention." In order to
resolve this, and other conflicts,8" the Supreme Court granted
Eastern's petition for certiorari.8 2
Following the procedure for treaty interpretation laid out in
Saks, the Supreme Court began its analysis "with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used"83
74 Floyd I, 499 U.S. at 533.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (N.M. 1973).
78 In, re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport, 629 F. Supp.
307, 314 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
79 Floyd II, 872 F.2d at 1467.
80 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974). Consid-
ering the extent of disagreement over the correct translation of "lesion
corporelle" since Rosman, it is interesting to note, as does the Eleventh Circuit,
that "[t]he Rosman analysis is flawed... because it failed to consider the French
legal meaning of the language in Article 17." Floyd II, 872 F.2d at 1476.
81 The court further noted courts of first instance that have disagreed on this
issue. See Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 534 n.3.
82 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 496 U.S. 904 (1990).
83 Saks, 470 U.S. at 397.
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and proceeded by looking to the French text as "the only au-
thentic text of the Warsaw Convention. 84 The French text of
Article 17, as ratified by the United States, reads: "Le transporteur
est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de
toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui
a cause le dommage s'est produit d bord de l'aeronef ou au cours de
toutes opbrations d'embarquement et de debarquement."85
The English translation reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 86
Essentially, in order for a plaintiff to recover under Article 17,
it must demonstrate that there has been (1) an accident (2) in
which the plaintiff has suffered death, wounding, or bodily in-
jury and (3) the injury took place on board the aircraft or in the
course embarking or disembarking.87 The only issue before the
court, however, was whether lesion corporelle was properly inter-
preted to mean "bodily injury" and, if so, whether the require-
ment could be satisfied by a purely mental injury.88
The court began its analysis of the foreign text by looking to
bilingual dictionaries and concluding that, if the translations are
correct, they suggest that Article 17 does not permit recovery for
purely mental injuries.8 However, recognizing that "dictionary
definitions may be too general for purposes of treaty interpreta-
tion," the court then turned its analysis to French legal materials
"to determine whether French jurists' contemporary under-
standing of the term 'lesion corporelle' differed from its trans-
lated meaning."90 Examination of legislation, judicial decisions,
and scholarly treatises ultimately proved fruitless and the court
was forced to conclude that, in French law in 1929, the term
lesion corporelle was neither a widely used legal term nor did it
appear to specifically encompass mental injuries.9 1
84 Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 535.
85 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, 49 Stat. 3000, 3005.
86 Id. at 3018.
87 Floyd I, 499 U.S. at 535-36.
88 Id. at 536.
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It is significant, nevertheless, to note the court's acknowledge-
ment that the French civil law of damages at the time the War-
saw Convention was being drafted did, in fact, allow recovery for
emotional and mental distress. 92 But because this was deemed a
general proposition of French tort law and because the court's
responsibility was "to give the specific words of the treaty a mean-
ing consistent with the shared expectation of the contracting
parties, ' 93 the court found it unlikely that the contracting par-
ties would have displaced their "apparent understanding of the
term 'lesion corporelle'. . .by a meaning abstracted from the
French law of damages."9  Since the court's examination failed
to demonstrate that lesion corporelle specifically encompassed
mental injuries, it determined that the contracting parties would
not have used the term to express such an expansive
proposition.2
This conclusion is problematic for several reasons. First, the
court's analysis yielded no "apparent" understanding of the
term that could be "displaced." If it had, the analysis would have
ended long before the court's discussion moved to the conven-
tion's textual structure and negotiating history and the ongoing
debate as to the drafters' intent would at last have been laid to
rest. Second, the court, both in Saks and in Floyd, espoused the
controlling nature of the French legal meaning of the Warsaw
Convention. The court reasoned that because continental ju-
rists drafted it in French we must "look to the French legal
meaning for guidance as to [the shared expectations of the con-
tracting parties] ."6 To acknowledge that French law permitted
tort recovery for mental distress alone and then discount this
information because it is a general principle not specifically en-
compassed in the chosen terminology is to completely ignore
the controlling nature of the French legal meaning. While the
term lesion corporelle may not specifically include the broader in-
terpretation encompassing mental injuries, the evidence cer-
tainly does not suggest that mental injuries were to be
specifically excluded.
After its exhaustive search for a correct interpretation, the
court was forced to confess that "there [was] no evidence that
the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically
92 Id.
93 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
94 Floyd I, 499 U.S. at 540.
95 Id.
96 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399; Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 535-36.
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considered liability for psychic injury or the meaning of 'lesion
corporelle"' 97 and listed two possible explanations for why the
subject of mental injuries never arose. These reasons were: "(1)
many jurisdictions did not recognize recovery for mental inju-
ries at that time, or (2) the drafters simply could not contem-
plate a psychic injury unaccompanied by a physical injury."98
Citing these explanations, the court noted that "the drafters
most likely would have felt compelled to make an unequivocal
reference to purely mental injury if they had specifically in-
tended to allow such recovery."99 It is just as plausible, however,
if not more so, that the drafters did not specifically address lia-
bility for mental injuries because it was already encompassed in
lesion corporelle as provided by the general principles of French
civil law. I..
Dismissing the fact that French law recognized recovery for
mental distress long before the Warsaw Convention was drafted,
the court seemed to focus more on the fact that many common
law jurisdictions excluded recovery for mental distress in
1929."1" By doing so, the court's analysis repeats the same error
of some of the lower courts by ignoring the fact that France's
civil law system makes no distinction between mental and physi-
cal injuries and inappropriately imports the common law view
that there is a distinction. 0 2 In fact, "[t] here is no counterpart
in French law to the common law doctrine which distinguishes
between physical injury (compensable), and purely mental or
emotional injury unaccompanied by physical injury (not com-
pensable). To the contrary, French law permits recovery for any
damage whether material or moral."' 3
The court's primary concern seems to be that if the broader
interpretation were adopted, which would allow recovery for
mental injuries, the Warsaw Convention's purpose of "limiting
the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth of the
fledgling commercial aviation industry"'" 4 would be upset. This
concern may be allayed with the realization that courts will not
9 Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 544.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 545.
100 Lisa M. Fromm, Note, Eastern Airlines v. Floyd: Airline Passengers Denied Jecov-
ery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention, 25 AKRON L. REv. 425, 434
(1991).
10, Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 545 n.1O.
102 Floyd If, 872 F.2d at 1478.
103 Id. at 1472.
104 Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 546.
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allow recovery for every claim for mental injury up to the limits
imposed by Articles 20 and 22, or even by private agreements
external to the Warsaw Convention; the damages actually sus-
tained by a plaintiff must still be proved. 10 5 Another of the con-
vention's purposes, to establish a uniform scheme of dealing
with claims arising out of international transportation (includ-
ing the assessment of liability for damages caused in the course
of transportation, as well as resolving jurisdictional complica-
tions arising from such assessment)," 6 would also be better
achieved if the French legal meaning were allowed to control.
The Supreme Court, upon reaching the conclusion that
"there [was] no evidence that the drafters or signatories of the
Warsaw Convention specifically considered liability for psychic
injury or the meaning of 'lesion corporelle,'" ' 107 could have de-
cided the issue either way. In the interest of promoting uni-
formity, one of the expressly stated purposes of the convention,
the court could have followed the only other signatory nation to
address this specific issue.'" 8 Instead, the language of the con-
vention was construed so that "an air carrier cannot be held lia-
ble under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifesta-
tion of injury."'0 9
2. Physical Manifestations of Emotional and Mental Distress
Borrowing from the analysis in Floyd, the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals later expanded the Supreme Court's
holding that "Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely
mental injuries"''" by concluding that even physical manifesta-
tions of emotional and mental distress are insufficient to satisfy
the Warsaw Convention's bodily injury requirement.'" While
these conclusions suggest agreement and uniformity, the courts'
seeming approval of and failure to adequately distinguish be-
tween cases wherein plaintiffs have been permitted or denied
1F5 Floyd 1I, 872 F.2d at 1480.
101 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99.
1F7 Floyd , 499 U.S. at 544.
"I" The Supreme Court of Israel adopted the view that the more expansive
interpretation of lesion corporelle was preferable and concluded that purely mental
injuries were compensable under the Warsaw Convention. See Cie Air France v.
Teichner, 39 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien, at 243, 23 EuR. TR. L., at 102.
1Floyd 1, 499 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 534.
I See Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 111; Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051.
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recovery for emotional distress based upon a showing of, or fail-
ure to show, subsequent physical injury demonstrates that the
perception of agreement and uniformity is merely superficial.
In Terrafranca, the plaintiff alleged no specific bodily injury,
but argued that weight loss, brought on by posttraumatic stress
disorder and complicated by anorexia, was a physical manifesta-
tion of mental injury, sufficient to satisfy the bodily injury re-
quirement of Article 17.112 This emotional distress developed as
the result of a bomb threat announcement made when the
plaintiff was on an international Virgin Atlantic Airway's flight
en route to London, England."' In accordance with the air-
line's policy, the flight crew relayed to the passengers that they
had received a "nonspecific warning which could be related to
one or more targets but where there could be doubt as to its
credibility or about the effectiveness of existing security mea-
sures."' 4 The plaintiff became so concerned about the safety of
her son and so upset and frightened by the incident that she was
unable to return to the United States with her family as planned
and, instead, remained in England for an additional six
weeks.' 15
The Third Circuit summarized the Floyd court's analysis of the
limitations contained in Article 17, and concluded that:
After the Court's exhaustive examination of the French text of
the Warsaw Convention, its legislative history, French dictiona-
ries, French civil law, the intent of the signatory nations, treatises,
and similar international treaties, and the Court's determination
that Article 17 requires 'bodily injury,' Mrs. Terrafranca's argu-
ment is simply not persuasive. ...
... [T] he repeated emphasis on 'physical injury' underscores the
central holding of Floyd: a passenger cannot recover absent bod-
ily injury.' 1
Because the Third Circuit found the holding in Floyd to be
distinctly physical in scope, it required little more to decide
whether physical manifestations of emotional and mental dis-
tress were sufficient to satisfy the bodily injury requirement.
The court simply held that a plaintiff must demonstrate "direct,
112 Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 110.
113 Id. at 109.
114 Id.
115 Id.
I 6 Id. at Ill.
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concrete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear
or anxiety. '117
3. Mental Injuy as Physical Injury
Several federal district courts have had to wrestle with similar
issues, but have not been able to reach a consensus."' For ex-
ample, in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October
31, 1994,"9 sixty-eight people were killed when their airplane
tragically crashed.12 The dispute focused on whether pre-im-
pact fear and terror were properly characterized as purely
mental injuries, thereby barring recovery under Floyd.'2' The
court agreed with this characterization, but argued that the Su-
preme Court's holding merely made physical injury a precondi-
tion to liability and that once that precondition was met, there
was nothing in Floyd stating that damages were unavailable for
mental injuries.1 2 2 In addition, "Article 17 itself expressly re-
quires a causal link only between 'damage sustained' and the
accident" and in no way implies that mental injuries are com-
pensable only if caused by bodily injuries.'23 As a result, the
court permitted recovery for pre-impact terror notwithstanding
the fact that the mental injuries did not flow from the physical
injuries. 124
Two years later, the court in Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc.
disagreed with the conclusions drawn in Roselawn. The issue
arose from the plaintiffs claim of emotional and psychological
trauma resulting from an incident where the passengers aboard
an American Airlines flight were required to evacuate their
smoke-filled airplane while it was still sitting on the tarmac of
New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport.125  The
117 Id.
118 Compare In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31,
1994, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (permitting recovery for mental injuries
that are merely accompanied by physical injuries), with Alvarez v. American Air-
lines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 1027, 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999) (permit-
ting recovery for mental injuries only when proximately caused by physical
injuries).
I", In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 954 F.
Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
120 Id. at 176.
121 ld.
122 Id. at 178.
123 Id. at 179.
124 Id.
125 Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 1027, 1999 WL 691922, at *1-
2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999).
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plaintiff received slight injuries when sliding down the inflated
emergency slide and was later diagnosed as having posttrau-
matic stress disorder. 126
After briefly summarizing the opposing views in various juris-
dictions, the Alvarez court held with the majority of courts that
"to recover for psychological injuries" there must be "a causal
link between the alleged physical injury and the alleged psycho-
logical injury. "127 The court reasoned that to do otherwise
would undermine the holding in Floyd and, as a practical matter,
would allow plaintiffs to skirt the bar on recovery for purely
mental injuries simply by alleging physical injuries, no matter
how slight.12  To prevent this back door from opening, the
court determined that "a plaintiff may recover compensation for
psychological and emotional injuries only to the extent that
these injuries are proximately caused by his or her physical
injuries."'121
The same year that Alvarez was decided, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Montana arrived at a unique con-
clusion, significantly distinct from the holdings in other federal
district courts and even the Third Circuit's decision in Ter-
rafranca. The issue before the court in Weaver v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.' 30 was essentially the same as in the cases previously dis-
cussed; it addressed a claim of posttraumatic stress disorder aris-
ing from the emergency landing of a Delta Airlines flight
necessitated by mechanical problems. 3 ' Unlike the analysis in
other decisions, however, this court sought to answer the issue
of liability, not by trying to find the existence of an accompany-
ing physical injury or even the causal connection between post-
traumatic stress disorder and an accompanying physical injury,
but by treating the disorder, heretofore deemed a "mental in-
126 Id.
127 Id. at *3.
128 Id. at *4.
129 Id. at *5.
130 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999), vacated,
211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002). Almost three years after the decision in
Weaver, the original order was vacated pursuant to the parties' joint and stipu-
lated motion. Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont.
2002). It should be noted, however, that it is the court's analysis, not the prece-
dential value of its decision, that is significant. The court, relying on the in-
creased sophistication of medical science, reasoned that chronic posttraumatic
stress disorder resulting from biochemical reactions brought on by terror was, in
and of itself, a "bodily injury." Weaver, 56 F. Supp 2d at 1192.
131 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91.
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jury," as a "physical injury."'132 By characterizing posttraumatic
stress disorder in this way, it would then be encompassed within
the bodily injury requirement of Article 17.
The court found the action distinguishable from previous
cases and justified its treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder
as a physical injury by relying on "recent scientific research ex-
plaining that [the disorder] evidences actual trauma to brain
cell structures."'' 1 3 Accepting this evidence, the court went on to
acknowledge the Supreme Court's determination that purely
mental injuries are precluded from recovery under the Warsaw
Convention, but reasoned as follows:
Granted, Weaver's injury manifests itself in ways that are similar
to the 'injuries' previously found not compensable in similar
cases under the Warsaw Convention. However, the central factor
here is not legal, but medical. The legal question in this case is
simply whether the Warsaw Convention allows recovery for this
particular kind of bodily injury, i.e., a brain injury (even with
slight physical effects). The answer must be yes. 131
Making such a pronouncement is significant because, despite
the long-held belief that mental injuries and physical injuries
are wholly distinct, the court clearly identified the fact that there
is a relationship linking the two. In addition, the Weaver court
discounted the contention of some other courts addressing this
issue, explaining: "[N]o floodgates of litigation will be opened
by allowing for claims such as Weaver's, which are based on a
definite diagnosis of a disorder that arises from a physical injury
that is medically verifiable. Fright alone is not compensable, but
brain injury from fright is.' ' - 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later addressed this issue
in Carey. During a flight from Costa Rica to Los Angeles en
route to his home in Portland, a United Airlines ("United")
flight attendant and an alleged representative of the Federal Air-
line Administration ("FAA") confronted Carey and an alterca-
tion ensued. 3" At different times in the flight, two of Carey's




136 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1046. Note also that for the purposes of its summaryjudgment motion, United did not dispute Carey's allegations; therefore, the facts
are Carey's version of events on the flight from Costa Rica to Los Angeles as
presented in a letter from Carey to United's Chairman of the Board. [d. at 1046
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three daughters, assigned to seats in the coach section of the
aircraft and hoping to relieve their earaches, sought pain medi-
cation from their father, seated in the first class cabin. 137 Refer-
ring to FAA regulations, a flight attendant warned Carey that it
was impermissible for his children to enter the first class cabin
and Carey complied despite the fact that his daughter was crying
and in pain. Carey's second child subsequently entered the first
class cabin and the flight attendant proceeded to reprimand Ca-
rey and threatened arrest, stating that there was a representative
of the FAA aboard the flight with the authority to do so.
When Carey later confronted the alleged FAA representative
and asked to see some identification, the alleged representative
and the flight attendant both refused to give the alleged FAA
agent's name. 138 This resulted in an altercation wherein Carey
was insulted, profaned, and humiliated in the presence of the
other passengers. Upon his return to Portland, Carey learned
from a telephone conversation with the FAA that the alleged
representative on the flight was probably not an FAA agent after
all.' 39 Following the incident Carey claimed not only to have
suffered severe emotional and mental distress, but also nausea,
cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension, and sleeplessness.1 40
Carey brought suit against United in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon alleging intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and false imprisonment. 14 1 When the district court granted
United's motion for summary judgment,142 Carey then appealed
the decision, arguing that the Warsaw Convention was not his
exclusive remedy and that, even if it was, his injuries satisfied the
bodily injury requirement of Article 17.143 Reviewing the district
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, the Ninth Circuit
not only agreed that Carey's claims were governed solely by the
Warsaw Convention, 144 but also that there are no exceptions to
137 Id. at 1046.
138 Id.
131) Id. at 1046 n.2.
140 Id. at 1046.
141 Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (Or. 1999), affd,
255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
142 Id. at 1176.
143 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1046.
144 Id. at 1048. "[T]he Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from main-
taining an action for personal injury damages under local law when [the] claim
does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention." Carey v.
United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (Or. 1999), affd, 255 F.3d 1044
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this rule even in the case of an air carrier's intentional
misconduct. 145
Once the court determined the Warsaw Convention afforded
Carey's only remedy, it broached the subject of whether Carey's
injuries satisfied the requirements of Article 17.146 The court
adopted the bulk of reasoning articulated in Terrafranca, hold-
ing that "physical manifestations of emotional and mental dis-
tress do not satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement," and added
that to hold otherwise would undermine the ruling in Floyd.
147
However, the court went a step further by supporting its holding
with what it characterized as strong dictum in El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tseng. 148
In Tseng, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff "sus-
tained no 'bodily injury' and could not gain compensation
under Article 17 for her solely psychic or psychosomatic inju-
ries."'149 The Carey court then determined to ascertain the Su-
preme Court's meaning in using this language and found the
following: "Psychosomatic is defined as '[o]f or relating to phe-
nomena that are both physiological and psychological' and as
'one who experiences bodily symptoms because of mental con-
flict.'""" The court then took these definitions, used in the con-
text of the discussion in Tseng, "as a strong indication that the
Supreme Court would hold that physical manifestations purely
descended from emotional and mental distress do not satisfy the
'bodily injury' requirement in Article 17."151
While this may be an accurate prediction of the Supreme
Court's response to claims of mental injuries accompanied by
physical manifestations of such injuries, the Carey court fails to
recognize the significance of the Weaver and Roselawn decisions.
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176
(1999).
145 Even though the plaintiff in Tseng waived her challenge to the district
court's finding that "willful misconduct" cannot be an "accident" under the War-
saw Convention, the Supreme Court included as dicta an indication that "inten-
tional misconduct can fall under the definition of 'accident,' provided that the
conduct otherwise meets the standard laid out in Saks." Carey, 255 F.3d at 1049;
see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
146 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051.
147 Id. at 1052.
148 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
149 Id. at 172.
151 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053 n.51 (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVER-
sITY DICTIONARY 950 (1994)).
151 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
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The court attempts to distinguish these cases;5 2 however, it can-
not be ignored that the claims in Weaver and Roselawn were com-
pensable despite the fact that the mental injuries involved did
not flow from any form of physical injury.'53 In its response to
Weaver, the court even left open the possibility that a plaintiff
who experiences "biochemical reactions" resulting from emo-
tional distress may recover damages, 54 not realizing that these
types of reactions are no different from Carey's claim that physi-
cal manifestations arose from the emotional distress brought on
as a result of his mistreatment by United.
The most reasonable explanation for this is that the Carey
court, like so many before it, simply accepted the common law
idea that mental injuries are completely separate and distinct
from physical injuries, with only the latter being compensable.
By following the lead of Weaver, however, a holding recognizing
the relationship that exists between mental and physical injuries
"has the potential of allowing for more valid actions under the
Warsaw Convention, with the increase attributable only to the
increased sophistication of medical science." 1'55
C. CONTINUING QUESTIONS
By retaining language virtually mirroring the original text of
the Warsaw Convention, and because the court in Floyd expressly
refused to state its opinion, the question remains whether physi-
cal manifestations of emotional and mental distress satisfy the
bodily injury requirement of either the Warsaw or Montreal
Convention. If the drafters had opted to leave in the early draft
language, it is clear that mental injuries would have been com-
pensable under the new convention; however, by failing to keep
the addition, we are left to wonder at the drafters' intentions.
It is arguable whether emotional and mental distress were
meant to be specifically excluded from the Montreal Conven-
tion because the addition of the words "mental injury" in early
drafts of the convention were later removed from the final draft.
One commentator has suggested that "[t] he reintroduction of
the words 'bodily injury' and the removal of 'personal and
mental injury' could be interpreted either way-that the final
draft intended retaining exclusively physical injury with no hint
152 Id. at 1054.
153 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; Roselawn, 954 F. Supp. at 179.
154 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053 n.47.
15 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
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of mental injury, or, that mental injury is imputed to bodily in-
jury, taking into consideration the emergent trend of linking
mental injury with a tangible bodily injury." '156 Since the inten-
tions of the drafters remains unclear, and the text can be con-
strued to have either meaning, the Montreal Convention leaves
the issue open to the same debate that existed under the War-
saw Convention.
Whether or not mental injury was meant to be expressly in-
cluded or excluded under the Montreal Convention, it seems
most likely that mental injury is still implicated through the use
of the words "bodily injury." In Zicherman v. Korean Airlines
Co., 1 5 7 the court determined that the French word dommage
could be construed broadly and that it was used by the drafters
of the Warsaw Convention in the sense of a legally cognizable
harm. 158 This decision "incontrovertibly brings to bear the com-
pelling significance of legally cognizable harm as being a com-
pensable element and therefore admits of mental injury as
damage under Article 17, if the domestic law applicable to a
case were to deem mental injury as such."'159 While this may be
true, the difficulty in the United States stems from the courts'
traditional treatment of physical and mental injuries as wholly
distinctive and their hesitancy to "adjudicate upon anything
which was not apparent or proven on an empirical basis. '"""' As
a result, mental injuries not flowing from physical injuries have
typically been rejected because it was thought that "mental suf-
fering and its consequences [were] so evanescent and intangible
that they [could not] be foreseen or anticipated and for that
reason have no reasonable proximate causal connection with
the act of [a] defendant."''
Even so, a minority of jurisdictions have altered this tradi-
tional treatment and permitted recovery for damages resulting
from mental injuries that do not flow from accompanying physi-
cal injuries. Some states like Illinois, for example, which once
adhered to the common law principle that recovery for mental
injuries must flow from physical injuries, have radically altered
their positions to provide increased protection of freedom from
156 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 227.
157 Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
158 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 227.
159 Id.
1li, Id. at 233.




emotional distress. 62 Other states like Kansas and Louisiana
have accepted the view that mental distress is independently
compensable and requires neither a demonstration of an inten-
tional act nor that there be any accompanying physical
injuries. 6 '
Despite the fact that some jurisdictions have recognized
mental injuries as an independently compensable cause of ac-
tion, most jurisdictions still require that a mental injury flow
from a physical injury before it can be compensable. One of the
reasons the majority of jurisdictions still adhere to the latter re-
quirement stems from the difficulty in legally defining and prov-
ing the existence of a mental injury. Medical science, however,
has debunked this legal attitude by clearly identifying mental
disturbance.164 By doing so, the difficulties associated with le-
gally defining mental injury apart from a more apparent and
tangible physical injury have all but disappeared as, from a med-
ical perspective, mental injury is simply a form of physical injury.
Unfortunately, "although in many areas of the law academic
opinion and judicial decisions have been symbiotic, the courts
did not heed the comments of Prosser, Bohlen, and may others
who at an early stage recognized mental injury as independent
injury which infringes the interest of peace of mind."'6 5
When Floyd reached the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the court seemed to recognize the subtle relationship
between mental and physical injuries when it held that mental
injury was compensable under the Warsaw Convention.' 66 This
relationship was again recognized, and more clearly stated,
when the court in Weaver noted that the central determining
factor was not a legal question, but a medical question. 1 67 With
these decisions, the courts were "transcending the bounds of ju-
dicial parochialism and actually recognizing that there are other
162 Id. at 244.
163 Id. at 245.
64 Id. at 259.
165 Id. at 259-60 (citing WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
327-28 (4th ed. 1971); Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from
Negligence Without Impact, 41 N.S. Am. L. REG. 141 (1902); Herbert F. Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Fowler V.
Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liability for Emo-
tional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426 (1938); Calvert Macgruder, Mental and Emo-
tional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936).
166 Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499
U.S. 530 (1991).
167 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
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fields of human expertise that become relevant in the adjudica-
tion of human disputes." 168 When reviewing the Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Floyd, however, the Supreme Court was unable
to ascertain the same relationship, refused to acknowledge that
mental injury is separately definable and independent of the
traditional understanding of physical injury, and consequently
reversed the Eleventh Circuit."" This leads to the conclusion
that, although medical science has progressed to a point where
it has clearly identified mental disturbance, "the courts have not
taken the trouble to seek a definition for mental injury and this
ha[s] made their treatment of the injury misguided and often
erroneous." 1
70
Even if the majority of courts should continue to find that
mental injury is not a "legally cognizable harm" imputed in the
use of "bodily injury" as suggested by the decision in Zicherman,
the question would remain whether physical manifestations of
emotional and mental distress satisfy the bodily injury require-
ment of Article 17. By adhering to the traditional view that
mental injuries must flow from a physical injury, in the event
that the physical manifestation itself were to satisfy the bodily
injury requirement, the mental injury could not be construed as
flowing from the physical manifestation, but would merely be
closely associated with it. This may create additional jurispru-
dential difficulties since some courts have found certain circum-
stances to be so egregious as to warrant recovery even for
emotional distress preceding (i.e., not flowing from) any sort of
physical injury.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent uniformity stemming from the Supreme
Court's decision in Floyd, courts appear confused in their ap-
proach to dealing with mental injuries under the Warsaw Con-
vention and, because Article 17's language is almost mirrored in
the Montreal Convention, this confusion will probably continue.
It is unclear whether mental injuries are included in, or were
meant to be included in Article 17, and courts, while attempting
to establish some measure of uniformity, have failed to provide a
clear answer. This is because they have not adequately distin-
guished those cases wherein plaintiffs have been permitted to
168 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 255-56.
169 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
170 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 260.
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recover damages for mental injuries closely related to, but not
flowing from their physical injuries.
The difference between cases like Weaver and Roselawn, in
which plaintiffs' claims were compensable, and Carey, in which
there was no recovery available, is one measured only in the de-
gree of harm. Regardless of the close association of the Roselawn
crash victims' emotional distress to the actual injuries in-
curred'7 1 or the "biochemical reactions" resulting from emo-
tional distress in Weaver,' 2 the fact remains that the plaintiffs in
these cases suffered some form of emotional distress not flowing
from physical injury but were allowed to recover anyway. This
directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the sig-
natories of the Warsaw Convention left no remedy for those
claiming physical manifestations of emotional and mental dis-
tress "no matter how egregious the airline's conduct."' What is
more surprising is that the court seemed acutely aware of this
discrepancy when it admitted that there can be "recovery for
egregious incidents... where there is no concrete or visible 'bod-
ily injury.'""
Such an admission does not at all support the conclusion that
physical manifestations of emotional and mental distress are not
encompassed in Article 17. It suggests, instead, that such claims
can be considered within the meaning of "bodily injury" if they
satisfy a high threshold requirement. For this reason, the no-
tion of mental distress should be "viewed with circumspection,
which could be done," not by excluding the claim altogether,
but "by imposing stringent standards of proof of injury on the
plaintiff."175 This would not transform the Floyd standard into
an easily satisfied pleading formality opening the floodgates of
litigation, 17 as some have suggested, but allow the courts to
scrutinize more carefully the evidence before them.
'7' Carey, 255 F.3d at 1054.
172 Id. at 1053 n.47.
173 Id. at 1053.
174 Id. at 1053 n.47.
175 Abeyratne, supra note 59, at 230.
176 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052.
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